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I.

INTRODUCTION

In its crusade against South Florida drug trafficking, the federal government
has revived an old weapon in rem civil forfeiture suits against property
involved in drug transactions. In rem forfeiture actions involve procedures traditionally employed in customs and admiralty jurisprudence. The government
first obtains an ex parte seizure warrant from a magistrate. Thereafter, it may
seize any property it believes was used to facilitate a drug transaction in any
manner.
Current statutes place few limits on the government's power to seize an
innocent person's property pursuant to these procedures. Assuming the owner's
innocence is a defense to forfeiture, the process due the owner under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments is limited. The owner is not entitled to a preseizure, adversarial hearing to contest the seizure's legitimacy even on a prima
facie basis. Unlike private litigants under admiralty law, the government is not
required to post a bond covering possible damages to the owner. Nor is the
government required to expedite any subsequent forfeiture litigation; indeed, it
need not even file a forfeiture complaint immediately. Most importantly, once
a forfeiture complaint is filed and the owner is given a forum to present his
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claim, the owner must litigate over a lengthy period of time for an asset, for
example an automobile, that has both limited and depreciating value.'
The government's ability to seize property and hold it almost indefinitely
raises serious due process concerns. This article suggests the only way to reconcile the government's power under the forfeiture statutes and regulations with
due process is to require as some courts do by rule or fiat, that courts provide
owners with prompt post-seizure hearings. In such hearings, the government
would bear the initial burden of showing probable cause that the property was
involved in unlawful activity.
II.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME

The government is authorized to commence drug-related forfeitures through
specific provisions of the federal narcotics statutes.2 These narcotics statutes,
however, do not establish the procedures through which forfeiture is accomplished. Rather, they incorporate by reference the long-established procedures
set forth in the customs statutes .
Forfeiture actions commenced under this scheme are actions in rem, against
the "offending" piece of property. Because civil in rem forfeitures are independent of any criminal proceedings, the government need not convict or even
charge the owner with a crime related to the seized property. The property is

1. Courts have recently chided the government for improperly seizing property under the
rubric of the customs statutes and forcing claimants to undergo costly litigation and unwarranted
discovery. See, e.g., Fonseca v. Regan, 734 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir. 1984.)
2. Section 881 of Title 21 of the United States Code provides in pertinent part:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft ... which are used, or are intended for use, to
transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or
concealment of property described in (1) or (2) above, except that(A) no conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the transaction of
business as a common carrier shall be forfeited under the provision of this section unless
it shall appear that the owner or other person in charge of such conveyance was a consenting
party or privy to a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter; and
(B) no conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section by reason of
any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or committed
by any person other than such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully in the possession of a person other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of the United
States, or of any State.
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982).
3. Section 881(d) provides in pertinent part:
(d) The provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and
condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws; the disposition of such property
or the proceeds from the sale thereof; the remission or mitigation of such forfeitures; and
the compromise of claims shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to
have been incurred, under the provisions of this subchapter, insofar as applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions hereof....
21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1982). The procedures are set forth in 19 U.S.C. S 1602-1618. See infra notes
11-16 and accompanying text.
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proceeded against and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty as though it
were a person. 4
In an in rem proceeding, the property is considered the "guilty" party
instead of the owner. The offense is therefore deemed to relate back to the
point in time when the property was used for the unlawful purpose.5 Thus,6
the government's right to the property vests at the moment of illegal use.
Concomitantly, courts have held that in rem forfeitures effectively extinquish the7
rights of unwitting secured parties and subsequent purchasers of the guilty res.
Only in later administrative proceedings does the statutory scheme expressly
protect the "innocent owner" by permitting him to petition the government
for mitigation or remission. 8 The executive branch's discretion under these procedures, much like the executive's pardon power, has generally held to be
judicially unreviewable. 9
Statutory provisions dictate the steps the government must follow before
initiating judicial forfeiture proceedings. Seizing officers must immediately report
each seizure to the appropriate official.' 0 Any further referrals necessary to
institute the forfeiture proceeding must be made promptly." The United States
Attorney responsible for instituting such proceedings must do so without delay

4. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 580 (1931). See
generally Note, RICO Fo.rDtures and the Rights of Innocent Third Parties, 18 Cal. W.L. Rev. 345, 349
(1982).
5. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974), reh'g denied 417
U.S. 977 (1974).
6. Florida Dealers & Growers Bank v. United States, 279 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1960).
7. The forfeiture statute takes effect immediately upon the commission of the illegal act. At
that moment, the right to the property vests in the United States, and when forfeiture is sought,
the condemnation when obtained relates back to that time and avoids all intermediate sales and
alienations, even as to purchasers in good faith. Simons v. United States 541 F.2d 1351-1352 (9th
Cir. 1976) (citing United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890)); see also Goldsmith-Grant Co. v.
United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921). See generally Note, Bank of American Forfiture Law - Banished
at Last? 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768, 773 n.37 (1977).
8. See 19 U.S.C. S 1618 (1982); infra note 15. The administrative procedures are discussed
in detail infra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
9. See United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811 (5th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted),
petition for reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 615 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
10. Section 1602 of title 19 provides:
It shall be the duty of any officer, agent, or other person authorized by law to make
seizures of merchandise or baggage subject to seizure for violation of the customs laws,
to report every such seizure immediately to the appropriate customs officer for the district
in which such violation occurred, and to turn over and deliver to such customs officer
any vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or baggage seized by him, and to report immediately to
such customs officer every violation of the customs laws.
19 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982) (emphasis added).
11. Section 1603 provides:
Whenever a seizure of merchandise for violation of the customs laws is made, or a
violation of the customs laws is discovered, and legal proceedings by the United States
attorney in connection with such seizure or discovery are required, it shall be the duty
of the appropriate customs officer to report promptly such seizure or violation to the United
States attorney for the district in which such violation has occurred, or in which such
seizure was made, and to include in such report a statement of all the facts and circum-
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unless, upon inquiry and examination, he decides such proceedings probably
2
cannot be sustained or that justice does not require further action.'
The owner of seized property valued at more than $10,000 is assured the
right to judicial review of the Forfeiture. 13 If the property is legitimately subject
to forfeiture, the statutory scheme provides a mechanism for discretionary, administrative mitigation or remission. It permits the appropriate administrative
4
authorities to take testimony in the event of protest.'
The statutory scheme also requires the government to file any forfeiture
action in the jurisdiction where the seizure occurred. The seizing agents must
file a report with the United States Attorney for the district in which the seizure
was made before the government may institute proceedings seeking condemnation of the property.' The United States Attorney then institutes forfeiture

19

19

19

19

stances of the case within his knowledge, with the names of the witnesses and a citation
to the statute or statutes believed to have been violated, and on which reliance may be
had for forfeiture or conviction.
U.S.C. S 1603 (1982).
12. Section 1604 provides:
It shall be the duty of The Attorney General of the United States immediately to
inquire into the facts of cases reported to him by customs officers and the laws applicable
thereto, and if it appears probable that any fine, penalty, or forfeiture has been incurred
by reason of such violation, for the recovery of which the institution of proceedings in
the United States district court is necessary, forthwith to cause the proper proceedings to
be commenced and prosecuted, without delay, for the recovery of such fine, penalty, or
forfeiture in such case provided, unless, upon inquiry and examination, the United States
attorney decides that such proceedings can not probably be sustained or that the ends of
public justice do not require that they should be instituted or prosecuted, in which case
he shall report the facts to the Secretary of the Treasury for his direction in the premises.
U.S.C. S 1604 (1982).
13. Section 1610 provides:
If the value of any vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or baggage so seized is greater than
$10,000, the appropriate customs officer shall transmit a report of the case, with the names
of available witnesses, to the United States attorney for the district in which the seizure
was made for the institution of the proper proceedings for the condemnation of such
property.
U.S.C. § 1610 (1982).
14. Section 1618 provides:
Whenever any person interested in any vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or baggage seized
under the provisions of this chapter, or who has incurred, or is alleged to have incurred,
any fine or penalty thereunder, files with the Secretary of Treasury if under the customs
laws or under the navigation laws.. .before the sale of such vessel, vehicle, merchandise,
or baggage a petition for the remission or mitigation of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
the Secretary of the Treasury.. .if he finds that such fine, penalty, or forfeiture was incurred
without willful negligence or without any intention on the part of the petitioner to defraud
the revenue or to violate the law, or finds the existence of such mitigating circumstances
as to justify the remission or mitigation of such fine, penalty, or forfeiture, may remit or
mitigate the same upon such terms and conditions as he deems reasonable and just, or
order discontinuance of any prosecution relating thereto. In order to enable him to ascertain
the facts, the Secretary of the Treasury may issue a commission to any customs officer
to take testimony upon such petition: Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed
to deprive any person of an award of compensation made before the filing of such petition.
U.S.C. § 1618 (1982).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1610 (1982).
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proceedings in the appropriate United States district court.
7
decision governs the disposition of the property.'
III.

6

The district court's

THE INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE

Both the United States Constitution and the forfeiture statutes exempt the
truly innocent property owner from the harshness of forfeiture under appropriate
circumstances.' 8 The property owner's innocence was not traditionally considered
a defense to seizure,' 9 but that rule has given way to an expanded construction
of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Thus, in
finding that forfeiture proceedings were sufficiently criminal in nature to permit
full application of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the
Supreme Court in United States v. United States Coin & Currency,20 recognized
"the difficulty of reconciling the broad scope of traditional forfeiture doctrine

16. 19 U.S.C. S 1604 (1982).
17. United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d 603, 609 (2d Cir. 1982). The only
provision not specifically directing actions to be taken in the jurisdiction where the property is
seized is 19 U.S.C. S 1602, which directs the seizing officer to "immediately" report to the
appropriate customs office "for the district in which such violation occurred, and turn over and deliver
to such customs officer any ...[items] seized by him...." 19 U.S.C. S 1602 (1982) (emphasis
added).
The provisions concerning storage and reporting expressly do not affect the jurisdiction where
legal proceedings must be commenced under section 1610. Thus, section 1605 states:
Pending [disposition of the property], the property shall be stored in such place as, in
the customs officer's opinion, is most convenient and appropriate with due regard to the
expense involved, whether or not the place of storage is within the judicial district or the
customs collection district in which the property was seized; and storage of the property outside
the judicial district or customs collection district in which it was seized shall in no way affect the
jurisdiction of the court which would otherwise have jurisdiction over the property.
19 U.S.C. S 1605 (1982) (emphasis added).
Administrative provisions promulgated pursuant to 21 U.S.C. S 881 also contemplate action
within the district where the property was seized. Section 881(d) permits the Attorney General to
designate officials other than customs agents to perform forfeiture duties under the Food and Drug
laws. In 28 C.F.R. S 9.3(a) (1984), for example, "petition[s] for remission...[must be] addressed
to the Attorney General...and submitted to the U.S. Attorney for the judicial district in which the
property is seized." 28 C.F.R. S 9.3(a) (1984) (emphasis added). The United States Attorney then
carries on the duties Title 19 places on customs agents. See 28 C.F.R. SS 9.3-.7 (1984). Similarly,
21 C.F.R. S 1316.71-.81 contemplates that actions be commenced in the judicial district where the
seizure occurred:
S 1316.78 Judicialforfeifure.
If the appraised value is greater than $10,000...the custodian...shall transmit a description of the property and a complete statement of the facts and circumstances surrounding the seizure to the U.S. Attorney for the judicial district in which the seizure was made
for the purpose of instituting condemnation proceedings.... (emphasis added).
21 C.F.R. S 1316.78 (1984).
18. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. S 881(a)(4) (1982) (quoted supra note 2).
19. See, e.g., General Motors Accept. Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1932);
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-511 (1921); Dobbin's Distillery v. United
States, 96 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1878). See generally Reed & Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Fodreitable "Interests,"
and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 57 (1984).
20. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
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with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.' '21 Accommodating these conflicting principles, the Court concluded that, viewed in their entirety, the forfeiture statutes penalize only those "significantly involved in a criminal
enterprise.'22
A few years later, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. ,23 the Supreme
Court upheld the application of a Puerto Rican forfeiture statute to the lessor
of a yacht leased to narcotics smugglers. However, the Court expressly left open
the question of whether the same result would obtain where the owner was
innocent of the crime and did all that could reasonably be expected to prevent
misuse of his property. In dicta, the Court suggested such an owner would be
constitutionally exempt from the reach of forfeiture statutes such as section 881.
To hold otherwise would, in effect, allow use of forfeiture proceedings for oppressive purposes outside the legitimate intent of the statutes. 24 A growing num25
ber of federal courts have adopted the Pearson Yacht dicta.
Section 1618 of the forfeiture provisions gives additional grounds for denying
forfeiture. It states that petitions for remission may be granted where the petitioner incurs forfeiture (1) without willful negligence, (2) without intent to
defraud the Government, (3) without intent to violate the law, or (4) in circumstances which justify the remission or mitigation of the forfeiture.2 6 Indeed,

21. 401 U.S. at 721. In fact, the difficulty in reconciling traditional forfeiture doctrine with
basic notions of fairness is not a new one.
In spite of the ancient rule,., and in spite of the executive branch's pardoning power,
there have always been judges and juries that refuse to follow the law. Unable to accept
the harshness of forfeiting a negligent person's property, and unwilling to accept the pardon
decision of the executive branches of government, they have either defied or "bent" the
law to prevent forfeiture. For example, juries in the American colonies often rebelled against
the King's laws by refusing to declare the property of a non-negligent owner to be forfeitable.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DRUG AGENT'S GUIDE TO FORFEITURE OF ASSETS 40 (1981)
(emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as DEA GUIDE].
22. 401 U.S. at 721.
23. 416 U.S. 663 (1974)
24. Id. at 689-90.
25. See, e.g., United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d 603, 607-08 (remanding to
district court for a hearing to consider petitioner's claims of non-negligent ownership and specifically
adopting the Pearson Yacht dicta as "in accord with the policy and history of civil forfeiture in this
country"); United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer, 563 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1977) (nonnegligent owners protected from forfeiture and entitled to judicial hearing to prove their lack of
negligence); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(denying forfeiture on basis of Pearson Yacht); cf United States v. One 1977 Cherokee Jeep, 639
F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiarn) (finding that since wife suspected her husband of involvement
with illicit drug activities, court did not have to consider whether the situation might otherwise be
"controlled by the Pearson Yacht dicta); United States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera Auto., 560 F.2d
897 (8th Cir. 1977) (explicitly reserving question of whether Pearson Yacht provides a potential defense
because petitioner was on notice of his son's narcotics activities). Significantly, no case addressing
the question squarely has reected the defense.
26. 19 U.S.C. 1618 (1982). Department of Justice Regulations further explain the standards
governing the discretion exercised under section 1618. See 28 C.F.R. 5§ 9.1-.7 (1984). Subsections
9.5(b) and (c) set forth the relevant standards:
(b) The determining official shall consider only whether the petitioner has satisfactorily
established his good faith and his innocence and lack of knowledge of the violation which
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the Drug Enforcement Administration has indicated that in the absence of affirmative negligence, property should be returned to its owner even when the
27
owner could have done more to prevent the property's illegal use.
Under these standards, the government violates an innocent owner's due
process rights if it retains possession of forfeited property indefinitely. The Sec2
ond Circuit addressed a similar situation in United States v. One Tintoretto Painting. 8
In that case, claimant Silberberg, an Israeli national, contested the forfeiture
of a valuable painting that his agent Vinokur had smuggled into the United
States to sell. Silberberg stated in affidavits that he did not authorize Vinokur
to act illegally in disposing of the painting, that Vinokur enjoyed a good reputation in the Israeli business community and that to the best of his knowledge
Vinokur had never been charged with any crime. 29 Silberberg further claimed
that Vinokur assured him that all customs regulations would be followed in
disposing of the painting. To this end Silberberg contracted with Vinokur to
30

reimburse him for any expenses.

The court ruled this showing was sufficient to entitle Silberberg to a hearing.
Any other result would make forfeiture an arbitrary act, serving no legitimate
government interest. Such an oppressive result would contravene the fifth
31

amendment.

Permitting indefinite retention of a citizen's property is equally difficult to
justify and would be at least as oppressive and harsh as the forfeiture deemed
contriry to the fifth amendment in Tintoretto. Mere legal-innocence of the underlying criminal act may not be enough to satisfy the Pearson Yacht requirement
that an owner do all he reasonably can to prevent the proscribed use of the
forfeited property; however, affirmative duty to investigate or discover how one's
property is being used, once legitimately entrusted to third parties, is too great
an obligation to pass muster under due process principles.
The scope of the owner's duty was discussed in great detail in United States
v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV.32 The court noted that knowledge or suspicion of
subjected the property to seizure and forfeiture, and whether there has been compliance
with the standards hereinafter set forth.
(c) The determining official shall not remit or mitigate a forfeiture unless the petitioner:
(1) Establishes a valid, good faith interest in the seized property as owner or otherwise; and

(2) Establishes that he at no time had any knowledge or reason to believe that the
property in which he claims an interest was being or would be used in a violation of the
law.

(3) Establishes that he at no time had any knowledge or reason to believe that the
owner had any record or reputation for violating laws of the United States or of any State
for related crime.
28 C.F.R. 9.5 (1984); see also 19 C.F.R. 5 171.13 (1984) (governing petitions for remission under
the customs statutes). Subsection 9.1 specifically makes these principles applicable to forfeitures
arising under the Contraband Transportation Act and Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970. 28 C.F.R. 9.1 (1984)
27. See DEA GUIDE, supra note 21, at 269.
28. 691 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1982).
29. Id. at 607.
30. Id. at 608-09.
31. Id. at 608 (citing Pearson Yacht, 416 U.S. at 689-90).
32. 462 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
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potential wrongdoing may trigger an affirmative duty on the part of the owner
to prevent illegal use of the property. Firsthand knowledge of another's criminal
involvement imposes a higher degree of care on the owner than does a case
involving no knowledge. The court recognized that the amorphous standard of
"what one could reasonably be expected to do" to prevent criminal use of
property must be tailored to the circumstances of each case. 3
An owner who does not suspect that his property is being misused has no
duty to prevent alleged misuse. Such an owner has done all that could reasonably be expected to ensure the property was not used in an illegal manner.
Accordingly, the innocent owner should be entitled to the return of his property.
IV.

THE PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIREMENT

For the government to obtain permanent possession of seized property, it
must eventually institute judicial forfeiture proceedings under the federal narcotics statutes,3 4 and follow the procedures set forth in statutes relating to the
Customs Service.3 5 The burden of proof in such proceedings is on the claimant,
provided the government first shows probable cause for the institution of the
action. 36

In showing probable cause, the government must establish a substantial
37
connection between the item to be forfeited and the relevant criminal activity.
The probable cause standard the government must demonstrate is a reasonable
ground for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere
suspicion .3 Delay by the government in litigating the action may, however,
jeopardize application of this probable cause standard.
33.
34.

Id. at 1391.
E.g. 21 U.S.C.

§ 881 (1982); see also supra notes 2, 3 and accomanying text; cf. 49

U.S.C. 5 781.
35. See 19 U.S.C. § 1602-1618 (1982); supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
36. Section 1615 of Title 19 provides in full:
1615. Burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings.
In all suits or actions (other than those arising under section 1592 of this tide) brought
for the forfeiture of any vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or baggage seized under the provisions
of any law relating to the collection of duties on imports tonnage, where the property is
claimed by any person, the burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant; and in all suits
or actions brought for the recovery of the value of any vessel, vehicle, merchandise, or
baggage, because of violation of any such law, the burden of proof shall be upon the
defendant; Provided, that probabe cause shall be first shown for the institution of such suit or action,
to be judged by the court, subject to the following rules of proof...
19 U.S.C. 5 1615 (1982) (emphasis in original).
37. United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424 (11th Cir. 1983); United States
v. $364,960.00 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United
States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1147 (7th Cir. 1982) ("before the forfeiture proceedings established in 19 U.S.C. 5 1607 become applicable it is incumbent upon the government to establish
that a nexus exists between the property seized and the violation of the Controlled Substances
Act"); Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III Pub. L. No. 95-633, 124 Cong. Rec. 517,
647 (Oct. 7, 1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. COD CoNs.
& Ao. NEws 9518, 9522 ("substantial
connection" required due to statutes such as 5 881).
38. United States v. $22,287.00, United States Currency, 709 F.2d 442, 446-47 (6th Cir.
1983); United States v. One 1974 Porsche 911-S, 682 F.2d 283, 285 (2nd Cir. 1982); United States
v. $364,960.00 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981).
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THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT OF A PROMPT POST-SEIZURE HEARING

The plain language of section 1615 of the forfeiture statute requires the
government to show probable cause before instituting forfeiture proceedings. In
addition, a probable cause hearing may be required upon demand prior to the
forfeiture trial itself. Indeed, as demonstrated below, Supplement Rule C of
the Admiralty Rules3 9 would be unconstitutional unless such a requirement were
grafted into the rules.
Due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner. ° Due process is a flexible concept which requires
procedural protections tailored to the demands of a particular situation. 41 Once
the court strikes the particular balance, however, due process almost always
requires both notice and the opportunity to be heard. Under its balancing
approach, 42 the Supreme Court allows the government flexibility only in its
timing. Absent an extraordinary situation, the government cannot seize a person's property without a prior judicial determination that the seizure is justified.43 One extraordinary situation where a prior hearing is unnecessary is the
seizure by government officers of articles subject to forfeiture."
In cases where the Court approves delaying the requisite hearing until after
the seizure, it consistently requires an immediate post-seizure proceeding to test,
at least as a preliminary matter, the legitimacy of the seizure. For example,
in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DI-CHEM, Inc, 45 the Court held that although
no pre-attachment notice and hearing were necessary under a garnishment statute, constitutional principles mandated an immediate and adequate post-attachment hearing." In concurrence, Justice Powell delineated the scope of due
process required at such a hearing. Much like the minimal probable cause
showing requested by claimants in a forfeiture proceeding, Powell noted that
in the garnishment context due process requires the state to afford the garnishee
an opportunity for a prompt post-garnishment judicial hearing. At the hearing,
39. See infra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
40. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)).
41. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
42. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In determining "what process is due,"
the Supreme Court utilizes a balancing test, which
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
43. United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. 555, (1983);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, reh'g drnied 409 U.S. 902 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971).

44. United States v. Von Newmann, 106 S. Ct. 610 (1986); United States v. Eight Thousand
Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. at 562 n.12; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
45. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
46. Id. at 607.
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the garnishor must show probable cause that continued garnishment is needed
to satisfy the debt.47
Thus, even when notice and a hearing are not required before the seizure,
due process plainly requires a prompt post-seizure hearing at which the Government bears the burden of establishing probable cause.4 These principles also
apply to the government in olher similar contexts.
VI.

THE PROCESs

DUE UNDER THE ADMIRALTY RULES

The Supplemental Rules for certain Admiralty and Maritime claims apply
to forfeiture proceedings due to the in rem nature of drug-related forfeiture
actions.4 9 Several courts have addressed the constitutionality of these rules because they do not contain an express provision requiring a post-seizure hearing.
In Merchants National Bank v. Dredge Gen. G.L. Gillespie,5° the Fifth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of Supplemental Rule C in the context of a private
in rem suit in Admiralty against eight vessels. Plaintiffs, the mortgage holders
of the vessels seized the vessels pursuant to Admiralty rules pending the outcome
of foreclosure proceedings. The defendants challenged the constitutionality of
Supplemental Rule C, which permitted this procedure.
The court, however, chose not to address the constitutionality of Rule C
on its face. It focused on the rule as applied. After first upholding the lack of
pre-seizure notice and hearing, the court held the post-seizure proceedings afforded the defendants sufficiently complied with due process.' Local Rule 21
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana explicitly granted a claimant the right to an interim probable cause-type hearing.52

47. Id. at 611-12 (Powell, J., concurring); accord Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,
618 (1974) (Louisiana sequestration statute upheld over due process challenge where no preseizure
notice but where debtor "was not left in limbo to await a hearing that might or might not
'eventually' occur... [since] Louisiana law expressly provides for an immediate hearing and dissolution of the writ 'unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the writ was issued' ").
48. See generally Kandaras, Due Process and Federal Property Fodreiture Statutes: The Need For Immediate
Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw. L.J. 925 (1980); Kandaras, Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need
to Guarantee a Prompt Trial, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 195 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Prompt Trial].
49. Supplemental Rule A(2) states that the Supplemental Rules are applicable to "[actions
in rem," and further provides:
These rules also apply to the procedure in statutory condemnation proceedings analogous
to maritime action in rem, whether within the admiralty and maritimejurisdiction or not. Except
as otherwise provided, references in these Supplemental rules to actions in rem include
such analogous statutory condemnation proceedings (emphasis added).
See also Supplemental Rule C(b) (providing that an in rem action may be brought "[w]henever a
statute of the United States provides for a maritime action in rem or a proceeding analogous
thereto"); Supplemental Rule E(5)(a) (exempting forfeiture actions brought by United States only
from special bond provision).
50. 663 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 966 (1982).
51. Id. at 1344.
52. Local Rule 21 of the United States District Court for Louisiana provides:
Whenever there is an arrest in ren or whenever property is attached, the party arrested
or any person having a right to intervene in respect of the thing attached, may, upon
evidence showing any improper practice or a manifest want of equity on the part of the

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss4/4

10

Strafer: Civil Forfeitures: Protecting the Innocent Owner

1985]

CIVIL FORFEITURES

The court added its belief that even districts which have not prescribed rules
equivalent to Western District Louisiana Rule 21 have the inherent power to
assure similar protection. To further emphasize that the Constitution required an
interim probable cause hearing the court stated that Rule C implies that if
requested, a hearing will be held shortly after arrest. 54 Finally, after discussing
the practical problems of requiring pre-seizure notice and hearing, the court
concluded that Rule C and the Admiralty's power to provide early post-seizure
55
relief supply adequate due process.
Similarly, in Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alexandros T. ,56 the court declared Supplemental Rule C constitutional primarily because the Rule, like other rules of
civil procedure, permitted a prompt post-seizure probable cause hearing. The
owner of seized property has the right to request a hearing and challenge the
validity of the seizure. Denial of such a request would result in an unconsti57
tutional application of Rule C.
On identical reasoning, the court in Polar Shipping, Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping
Corp.,58 upheld the constitutionality of Supplemental Rule B. Like the court in
Merchants National Bank, the court relied upon the fact that under the Local
Rules for the District of Hawaii the claimant could obtain a hearing within
twenty-four hours of any arrest or seizure of property under the Admiralty
Rules. 9 The court noted that Supplemental Rule B, together with the local
District of Hawaii Rules, provided an admiralty defendant a prompt and procedurally adequate post-attachment hearing. 6°
More recently, in Schiffaharsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottacchi,61 the
libellant, be entitled to an order requiring the libellant to show cause instanter why the
arrest or attachment should not be vacated.
D. LA. R. 21.
53. 663 F.2d at 1344.
54. Id. at 1343-44. The court cited Amstar Corp. v. M/V Alexandros T., 431 F. Supp. 328,
335 & n.7 (D. Md. 1977), mentioning that the court there stated that it would have immediately
granted a post-seizure hearing to claimants had they asked for it. 633 F.2d at 1344 n.10.
55. Id. at 1350; see also Lee Stoner v. O/S NEISKA II, 1978 A.M.C. 2650 (D. Alaska)
(upholding constitutionality of Rule C in part on basis of local rule providing for expeditious postseizure hearing). Cf Neapolitan Navigation, Ltd. v. Tracor Marine, Inc., 777 F.2d 1427 (11th
Cir. 1985); Karl Senner, Inc. v. M/V ACADIAN VALOR, 485 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. La. 1980)
(holding Rule C unconstitutional where no local rule permitted immediate post-seizure hearing).
56. 664 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 912.
58. 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982).
59. Id. at 640. Admiralty Rule 55 of the United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii provides:
II]n case of attachment of property,...in causes of...admiralty jurisdiction.... any person
having a right to intervene in respect to the thing attached, may upon evidence showing
any improper practices or a want of equity on the part of the libelant, have a mandate
from the judge for the libelant to show cause instanter why the.. .attachment should not be
vacated.
680 F.2d at 640 (emphasis in original).
The court in Polar Shipping interpreted the term "instanter" in the local rule to mean "within
twenty-four hours." Id.
60. Id. at 641.
61. 773 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the constitutionality of supplemental
Rule B against a due process attack. The court noted that the district court
62
had granted a post-seizure hearing the day after the seizure. Moreover, the
Court found persuasive the analytical approach followed in Merchants National
63
Bank, Polar Shipping, and Amstar Corp.
Claimants in the Southern District of Florida possess fewer procedural rights
than the parties involved in these private Admiralty cases. Supplemental Rule
E(5)(a) permits parties in private actions to post security at the court's discretion; the court may alternatively, stay the arrest or attachment entirely. Rule
E(5)(a), however, does not apply to seizures for forfeiture under federal law.
At best, the claimants might be able to post a double bond, as permitted by
Rule E(5)(b). Moreover, Local Rules for the Southern District of Florida contain
no "saving" provision expressly providing post-seizure hearing procedures.
However, as the court in Merchants National Bank indicated, courts in the southern districts have both the power and duty to fashion the appropriate relief
64
without explicit guidance by the rules.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty
Dollars in United States Currency,65 upheld the principle that a claimant is entitled
to post-seizure due process in an in rem forfeiture proceeding. The claimant
in that case, however, did not challenge the sufficiency of the post-seizure
hearing. 66 Nor did she attempt to initiate independent judicial proceedings to
force the issue. Instead, the fifth amendment challenge was directed at the time
67
lag between the seizure and the forfeiture trial.
62.

Id.

63. Id. Commentators have also recognized the necessity of an immediate post-seizure hearing
to test probable cause for any ex parte seizures.
[A] post-arrest/attachment hearing should be available upon application by anyone with an
interest in the seized property. At the hearing, the plaintiff should carry the burden of
showing a probability of success on the underlying claim before the seizure is allowed to
continue.
Note, Due Process in Admiralty Arrest and Attachment, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1091, 1114 (1978). See generally
Culp, Charting a New Course: Proposed Amendments to The Supplemental Rules For Admiralty Arrest and

Attachment, 103 F.R.D. 319 (1984).
64. The Local Rules for the Middle District of Florida also fail to contain any explicit postseizure hearing provisions. However, Local Rule 15(B) of the Local Rules for the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida do contain such a provision:
(B) Hearing on Security or Release of Property. In any case where property is attached,
garnished or arrested, the court, upon application of any party asserting an interest in
such property and upon notice to other known interested parties, may forthwith grant a
hearing at which the court may entertain motions for, and where appropriate grant, relief
as follows....
(5) ordering the release of attached or garnished property for failure of the plaintiff to
comply with Rule (b)(1) and E(2)(a), of the Supplemental Rules, subject to any prompt
and adequate amendment of the complaint, or for failure of the plaintiff, upon demand, to show
probable cause for attachment or garnishment, or for illegal or mistaken attachment

N.D. FLA. R. 15(B) (emphasis added).
65. 461 U.S. 555 (1983).
66. Id. at 569-70.
67. Id. at 562. The Supreme Court did not state that lengthy delay would not constitute a
violation of due process but only that the due process analysis should address the factors set forth
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VII.

PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING A PROMPT HEARING

Government forfeitures are generally preceded by seizures authorized by
warrants obtained from magistrates. Therefore, the most direct and least cumbersome method for obtaining prompt relief is through Rule 41(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 41(e) provides that a person subjected to
an unlawful search and seizure may move for the return of illegally seized
property in the district court for the district in which the government seized
the property. 6 The Rule further requires the district court to receive evidence
on any factual issue necessary to determine the motion.6 9 Thus, under the plain
language of Rule 41(e), federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain motions

for the return of property seized subject to forfeiture. 0
Ironically, the Solicitor General has suggested the use of Rule 41(e) in
71
obtaining relief from forfeiture. In Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars,
the government seized the claimant's property and held it for eighteen months
before initiating forfeiture proceedings. The government successfully argued that

in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (length of delay, reason for the delay, prejudice,
and articulation of the right) used in addressing speedy trial claims under the Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 564. Moreover, since the Supreme Court's decision in Eight Tousand Eight Hundred & Fifty
Dollars, at least two circuit courts of appeal have found constitutional violations under the reformulated standard. See Seguin v. Eide, 720 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. $23,407.69
in U.S. Currency, 715 F.2d 162 reh's denied 104 S.Ct. 29 (5th Cir. 1983).
68. Rule 41(e) reads in full:
(e) Motions For Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return
of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property which
was illegally seized. The judge shall receive evidence on any issues of fact necessary to
the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the property shall be restored and it
shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. If a motion for return of
property is made or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment or
information is filed, it shall be treated as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.
DEP'T, FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).

69. Id.
70. See United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Golding v. Director
of Pub. Safety Dep't, 400 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981) (court issuing search warrant had
jurisdiction to order return of attache case containing $201,500.00 in currency independent of any
civil replevin action); Sawyer v. Gable, 400 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981) (same).
Courts also have jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by virtue of their inherent supervisory
powers. The scope of these powers was a focus of the court's decision in Wilson. In ordering the
return of property the court held that "it is fundamental to the integrity of the criminal justice
process that property involved in the proceeding, against which no Government claim lies, be
returned promptly to its rightful owner. Therefore, the district court has both the jurisdiction and
duty to return such property." 540 F.2d at 1103.
A federal court's "jurisdiction and duty" to entertain a motion for return of property is also
"founded on the inherent supervisory power of the district court over law enforcement officials
within the district." United States v. Premises Known as 608 Taylor Avenue, 584 F.2d 1297,
1299 n.3 (3d Cir. 1978); accord United States v. Thirteen Machine Guns & One (1) Silencer, 689
F.2d 861, 864 n.l (9th Cir. 1982).
71. 103 S. Ct. 2005.
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the court should excuse this delay because the claimant retained a method of
72
securing interim relief in the form of a Rule 41(e) motion.

Some courts, including those in Florida, have required prompt probable
cause hearings in the forfeiture context. Indeed, in United States v. Certain Real
Estate Property,73 the court went so far as to hold section 881(b) unconstitutional

for not providing a pre-seizure ex parte hearing where the government sought
the forfeiture of real property.7 4 Based solely upon a conclusory complaint filed
under section 881(b) in conjunction with local Admiralty Rules, the government
in Certain Real Estate obtained an ex parte "arrest" warrant, not from a federal
district court judge or magistrate, but from a deputy clerk of the Court. The
property in question was a multi-million dollar chunk of real estate, upon which

a hotel, marina and restaurant were operating ongoing businesses. In executing
its "seizure" of the real estate, the government forced an evacuation of the
hotel, closed the marina and took over the operation of the restaurant - all
without any notice, hearing, or judicial review. Given the ongoing nature of
the businesses, the Court recognized that "[n]o post-seizure hearing will cure
the government's action." ' 75 Moreover, the Court correctly perceived that the
exigent circumstances normally present where tangible personal property is involved is absent where real estate and business enterprises are concerned. "The
Resort property was not going to disappear; the marina did not threaten to
76
sink into the sea."
Accordingly, the Court quashed the warrant and dismissed the forfeiture
complaint. Although the Court gave the government ten days to amend its
77
complaint, it neither chose to do so nor to appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.

72.

Id.

at

2014.

See

Brief

for

Appellant

at

30-37,

Eight

Thousand

Eight

Hundred

& Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. at 555. The Solicitor General argued to the Supreme
Court that a prompt post-seizure filing of the forfeiture complaint was not necessary because insistence on such a requirement "ignores the availability of other remedies that fully suffice to reduce
to an acceptable level the risk of an erroneous deprivation of property arising from a seizure."
Brief for Appellant at 31. One such alternative "remedy," the Solicitor General went on to describe
in detail, was Rule 41(e). The Solicitor General then argued that "the availability of the Rule
41(e) remedy clearly affords adequate process to guard against unjustified seizures and to root out
most instances in which seized property cannot ultimately be shown to be forfeitable." Id. at 32.
And, "[tihe availability of the Rule 41(e) remedy as a means of weeding out cases in which the
initial seizure of the property is illegal defines more precisely the present due process inquiry."
Id. the Solicitor General concluded that an immediate filing requirement was unnecessary because
"[i]n those instances in which there is a genuine basis for disputing the seizure or the forfeiture,
claimants.. .will pursue the remedies available under Rule 41(e) or an equitable suit to compel the
failing of the forfeiture action." Id. at 37. The Solicitor General returned to this same theme in
its Reply Brief, at 10-11.
73. 612 F. Supp. 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
74. Id. at 1495-98.
75. Id. at 1497.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1498. The Eleventh Circuit, shortly after Certain Real Estate, also recognized the
significance of the distinction between real and personal property in the forfeiture context. See United
States v. Ladson, 774 F.2d 436 (11th Cir. 1985) (government may not use forfeiture warrant obtained
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) as a pretext to conduct general search of real proerty). In United
States v. One Parcel of Real Property With Buildings, Appurtenances & Improvements, 767 F.2d 1495 (11th
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A right to a prompt post-seizure hearing exists even where the party's assets
are merely "restrainted" by the government and not physically seized. In United
States v. Spilotro,78 for example, the government charged the defendant with violations of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).79
The district court issued an ex parte restraining order at the government's
request enjoining the defendant from transferring or encumbering stock in a
business the government was attempting to forfeit under RICO section 1963(a).
The court granted the defendant a hearing on the propriety of the order. While
approving the ex parte procedure, the court held that once the restraining order
was in effect, the defendant had a constitutional right to a prompt hearing.
Moreover, the court held that due process was not satisfied by the defendant's
ultimate right to a hearing on the matter at trial. The court stated that the
government must produce adequate grounds for forfeiture of the seized property
prior to trial.80 The defendant was entitled to a preliminary hearing at which
the government had the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was guilty of a RICO offense and that the property at issue
was subject to forfeiture. 8 ' Further, the court held that this showing must be
82
made on the basis of a full evidentiary hearing and not on indictments alone.
83
Recently, the court in Lee v. Raab granted a motion for a preliminary
injunction against the Customs Service. Following an investigation, agents of
the Customs Service, acting without a warrant, placed padlocks and seals upon
all the doors of the movant's house and business, and delivered a notice that
it had seized the contents pursuant to the federal false statement statute8 4 and
to a customs-related statute. 5 The movant filed a complaint for damages and
injuctive relief and also moved for the return of the property pursuant to Rule
41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The court held that the fifth amendment required injunctive relief even if
the fourth amendment justified the warrantless seizures. The court found that
Cir. 1985), the court upheld the "seizure" of a restaurant under the Admiralty Rules for the
Northern District of Florida, because: (1) the claimants, unlike the situation in Certain Real Estate,
were allowed to continue operating their business; and (2) under the local Admiralty Rules, the
claimants could have sought a prompt post-seizure hearing.
78. 680 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982).
79. 18 U.S.C. S 1962 (1983).
80. 680 F.2d at 617.
81. Id. at 618.
82.

Id. Accord, United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.

Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated 104 S. Ct. 3575 (1984); United States
v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1983). Where the court held that a probable cause type

hearing was required to test the constitutionality of a restraining order entered in a continuing
criminal enterprise prosecution. Judge Aronovitz maintained that the reasonable doubt standard
was required but held that hearsay evidence was admissible. Id. at 1085-89. Cf. United States v.
Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (holding that since a restraining order issued
pursuant to the RICO statute "does not curtail the property interest of a defendant," the requisite
evidentiary hearing need only be governed by a dear and convincing standard of proof).
83.

576 F. Supp. 1267 (S.D. Ohio 1983).

84.
85.

18 U.S.C. 5 1001 (1982).
18 U.S.C. S 542 (1982).
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a one and one half month deprivation of property and the accompanying absence
of any grievance procedure constituted a violation of the plaintiff's due process
rights. 86 While the court recognized that the government had valid public interests to vindicate through the customs statutes, it found that effective enforcement conducted within the government's constitutional authority best served
those interests.5 7 Thus, even though the government acted pursuant to valid
law enforcement concerns, due process required that the owners have an early
opportunity to challenge the seizure.A
The applicability of Rule 41(e) to civil forfeiture proceedings is the subject
of some confusion in the case law. Where the government has seized property
but has not yet filed suit, the applicability of Rule 41(e) should be without
question. The mere intention to seek forfeiture of property is sufficient justification for a court to exercise jurisdiction. 9
Some courts have questioned the propriety of using Rule 41(e) or other
remedies after the commencement of civil forfeiture proceedings. In Castleberry
v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Division,9° Treasury agents seized Castleberry's
property and held it subject to forfeiture. Castleberry initiated a replevin action
against the government in federal court. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the replevin
action, suggesting that Castleberry's sole remedy lay in the forfeiture proceeding
itself. Following In re Behrens, 91 the court held that once forfeiture proceedings
are instituted, the legality of the seizure is properly contested only in those
92
proceedings.
The Fifth Circuit's reliance on Behrens is significant. 93 In Behrens, the court
was concerned with possible problems of sovereign immunity and federalism if

86. 576 F. Supp. at 1274.
87. Id.
88. Id. Because the court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, it did
not rule on the plaintiff's alternative motion under Rule 41(e). The court did not dismiss the
motion, but rather took it under advisement. Id. at 1275.
89. United States v. United States Currency, 495 F. Supp. 147, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). As
the court recognized in United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1976):
It goes without saying, that if the Government seeks to forfeit the property a proper
proceeding should be instigated to accomplish that purpose.... A claim by the owner for the
return of his property cannot be successfully resisted by asserting that the property is subject to fofeiture.

If the property is subject to fofeiture, appropriateproceedings should be started expeditiously. (citation
omitted) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Totaro, 468 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (D.
Md. 1970) (where no civil forfeiture action instituted, court had jurisdiction to hear posttrial Rule 41(e) motion).
Id. at 1104.
90. 530 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1976).
91. 39 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1930).
92. 530 F.2d at 675. Thus, the district court's grant of relief was limited to requiring the
Treasury agents to promptly institute forfeiture proceedings, or else return the property and abandon
the seizure. The court held the legality of the seizure itself is only determinable in the forfeiture
procedures.
93. The court's reliance on Behrens is also questionable. Both Castleberry and Behrens mistakenly
rely on Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817). Slocum holds that federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the rights and remedies of claimants to property seized by the
government under the then existing embargo statute. The Court there noted that if the government
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state-tort actions could properly be used to challenge or interfere with federal
forfeiture actions. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that in both Behrens and Castlebeny, the federal courts exercised exclusive jurisdiction in determining whether94
a forfeiture of seized property occurs under the laws of the United States.
This concern is not present in the context of a Rule 41(e) motion. Both in
rem forfeiture actions and Rule 41(e) motions must be filed in the federal court
95
having jurisdiction over the place where the. property was seized.
Moreover, even the Castelberry court acknowledged that its holding was subject to exceptions. For example, a claimant may file a civil tort action under
the Fifth Circuit's rationale where the government unreasonably delays initiating
forfeiture proceedings. 96 The few remaining instances where courts have limited
a person's right to proceed under Rule 41(e) are likewise distinguishable due
to their unusual factual settings. 97 The one district court decision addressing
unreasonably delayed in initiating forfeiture proceedings, the district court had jurisdiction to order
executive officials to initiate forfeiture proceedings, and that the government would be liable for
damages to the property while in the government's possession. 15 U.S. at 3-4. The limited remedies
mentioned by the Court in Slocum, however, must be viewed in light of the fact that at the time
federal courts lacked a general grant of federal question jurisdiction. Kandaras, supra note 47 (citing
C.

WRIGHT,

A.

MILLER, & E.

COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION S 3503

(1982)).
94. Castleberry v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Div., 530 F.2d at 674 (quoting Slocum v.
Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 9 (1817)); see also In re Behrens, 39 F.2d at 563 (2d Cir. 1930).
95. Compare 19 U.S.C. S 1610 (1982) (quoted supra note 13), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(eXquoted
supra note 68).
96. 530 F.2d at 675 n.5 ("[i]nstances may arise in which due to extraordinary circumstances,
manifest bad faith on the part of the government agents, or irreparable damage to the plaintiff,
more immediate and drastic relief would be appropriate"). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit recently
found that Casleberry did not prevent the district court from ordering the return of property to a
claimant on the basis of government default due to a four month delay in commencing a forfeiture
action, even though the government finally commence the action. Robinson v. United States, 734
F.2d 735 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Vance v. United States, 676 F.2d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding that Casteberry "has no effective application when the person whose property is seized has
not been notified of the pending action").
97. For example, in United States v. Fields, 425 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1970), the defendants
in a criminal case filed a motion for return of property along with a motion to suppress evidence.
The motion for return asked for the return of a seized vehicle, not to any of the defendants, but
to a third party. This third party, a brother of one of the defendants, never himself moved for
return of the vehicle, claiming it as his own. When the district court granted the motion, the
Third Circuit reversed, holding simply that Rule 41(e) could not be utilized to order the return
of property "to a party not before the court." 425 F.2d at 885; see also id. at 885-86 ("federal
courts decide cases and controversies between litigants, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e), does not and
probably could not grant to the district court authority to exercise, in favor of non-parties, some
sort of supervision over civil seizures and forfeitures").
The only other decision potentially limiting the use of Rule 41(e) is United States v. Rapp,
539 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1976). That case involved a complex set of circumstances. Rapp, the
defendant in a criminal case, jumped bail and fled the jurisdiction. While he was a fugitive, the
government instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against a vehicle seized at the time of his initial
arrest. Rapp was then re-captured, pled guilty to the criminal charges and sentenced. Rapp never
answered or contested the civil forfeiture proceedings, but instead filed a Rule 41(e) motion for
the return of the vehicle after his sentencing. Before the court ruled on the motion, the vehicle
was officially held forfeited in the civil proceeding. 539 F.2d at 1159. Nevertheless, Rapp continued
to press his motion for return of property under Rule 41(e). The Eighth Circuit held that Rapp
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the point squarely held that the government's filing of a civil forfeiture action
subsequent to the filing of a Rule 41(e) motion does not eliminate either the
court's jurisdiction or its duty to consider a pre-existing and timely Rule 41(e)
motion for return of seized property.98
In Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars,99 the government conceded
that some interim mechanisms were necessary to justify its continued retention
of a person's property subject to the forfeiture trial. Whether that interim relief
is brought about through a separately filed Rule 41(e) motion, as the Solicitor
General suggested, or by a motion addressed to the Court's equitable powers
in the forfeiture action,1 °° ultimately makes no difference as long as some adversarial device checks the government's unbridled power to seize and retain
a person's property. To permit the government to engage in summary seizures
and indefinite retention of property with no judicial scrutiny is an abuse of the
forfeiture statutes and should not be tolerated.
VIII.

POsT-DEPRIVATION

REMEDIES

In the forfeiture proceedings a claimant may counterclaim against the government directly under the fifth amendment. Such a remedy states a cause of
action independent from any other remedies a claimant may have, including
affirmative defenses and other possible causes of action.
The Supreme Court first implied an independent right of action directly
under the Constitution in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.'"' In Bivens, the
plaintiff alleged that federal agents violated his fourth amendment rights by
arresting him without a warrant or probable cause, and by searching him and
his home. The Supreme Court upheld his claim for damages under the fourth
amendment and rejected the government's argument that other forms of relief,

could not utilize Rule 41(e) under the circumstances for a number of reasons: (1) Rule 41(e) affords
a defendant no remedy after his conviction; (2) Rapp had other remedies, some of which he had
foregone; and (3) the motion was not brought "prior to indictment or institution of the forfeiture
process." 539 F.2d at 1160-61.
In Robinson v. United States, 734 F.2d 735 (11th Cir. 1984), the Eleventh Circuit found the
government's reliance on Fields and Rapp completely unpersuasive. Id. at 739.
98. United States v. United States Currency, 495 F. Supp. 147, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
The State courts in Florida are in full accord with the procedures suggested here. If property
is seized subject to a warrant, the issuing judge is deemed to have jurisdiction to entertain a motion
for return of the property. See Golding v. Director of Pub. Safety Dep't, 400 So. 2d 990, 991
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981); Sawyer v. Gable, 400 So. 2d 992, 994 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981). In 1980
the Florida legislature amended section 932.703(1) of the Florida Statutes in the Florida Contraband
Forfeiture Act to limit the jurisdiction of state courts to matters arising within the forfeiture proceedings themselves. Section 932.703(1) expressly provides that "[nleither replevin nor any other
action to recover any interest in such property shall be maintained in any court, except as provided
in this act." The Fifth District Court of Appeal, however, recently held this provision unconstitutional under both state and federal constitutions. Lamar v. Universal Supply Co., 452 So. 2d
626, 632 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1984).
99. 466 U.S. 555 (1983). See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
101. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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such as a state tort action in trespass, provided the only appropriate judicial
remedy. 10 2 In so holding, the Court cautioned that the discretion given federal
10 3
officials does not excuse acts committed in violation of the Constitution.
Any contention by the government that eventual relief on the merits of a
forfeiture suit can provide the full measure of an innocent owner's possible
relief would treat the government's forfeiture power as a "magic gift" that an
innocent owner must view as simply "disappearing" on the day the property
is finally returned. The unconstitutional seizure and retention of an innocent
owner's property is no less deserving of independent remedy than the unconstitutional search and seizure in Bivens or other damage claims against federal
officials.' °4 Several courts considering the issue have held that an independent
Bivens-type cause of action exists under the fifth amendment to remedy improper
seizures of property, despite the availability of other remedies. 10 5
In Seguin v. Eide,"'6 Seguin drove a friend, Benson, to the Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport in her car *so that Benson could pick up a package in
which gold Krugerrands from South Africa had been hidden. Customs agents
discovered the Krugerrands and claimed that the Krugerrands constituted "merchandise" that had not been declared, as required by law. In addition to seizing
the Krugerrands, the agents seized Seguin's car, alleging that it had been used
to facilitate the "smuggling" activities. Seguin filed for administrative relief,
claiming that she did not know that Benson was going to pick up contraband
at the airport. The customs service refused to return the car even though
criminal smuggling charges against Benson and his wife had been dismissed. 07
Seguin filed a Bivens-type action, claiming the administrative delays in returning her car violated her fifth amendment rights. The government contended
that this type of action was inappropriate because Seguin had other available

102.

See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (upholding damage claim against federal

prison officials directly under the eighth amendment even though allegations could also have
supported a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
103. See 403 U.S. at 391-92. Power, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when
it is wrongfully used. An agent acting - albeit unconstitutionally - in the name of the United
States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority
other than his own.
104. See supra note 102.
105. See, e.g., Seguin v. Eide, 645 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted and case remanded, 462
U.S. 1101, (1983), aff'd in part, reo'd in part, 720 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1984); Weiss v. Lehman,
642 F.2d 265 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 454 U.S. 807 (1981); Jacobson v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nom Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979); States Marine Lines v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974); cf. Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228 (1979) (implying fifth amendment claim under Constitution to challenge employment
decision); Pollgreen v. Morris, 496 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (prompt post-seizure hearings
following seizure of vessels a matter of due process under the fifth amendment; granting interim
injunctive relief); see also Prompt Trial, supra note 48, at 203-04.
106.

645 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981), cot granted and case remanded, 462 U.S. 1101, (1983), aff'd

in part, rev'd in part 720 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1984).
107. The Krugerrands had been deemed currency rather than merchandise.
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remedies. 08 These remedies included an action for return of the car and a suit
under the Tucker Act.' 9
The court in Seguin rejected the government's suggested alternatives and
stated that even if such actions could be brought, they would not represent an
adequate substitute for a Bivens suit." '0 A simple return of property does not
compensate the legitimate claimant for damages suffered stemming from the
improper deprivation itself. Consequently, the claimant's alternate causes of
action do not provide an adequate substitute for a Bivens damage remedy."'
IX.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The fifth amendment supplies an express waiver of sovereign immunity in
the forfeiture context." ' 2 In Weiss v. Lehman, n" 3 the court expressly upheld a
Bivens action arising under the fifth amendment.' ' 4 Even if the fifth amendment
is not considered an express waiver of sovereign immunity, the government's
commencement of litigation in Admiralty constitutes an implied waiver. The
government waives immunity with respect to counterclaims through the consent
implied from the government's institution of the litigation, at least where the
counterclaim arises, as it does in the forfeiture context, out of the same transaction or occurrence as the subject matter of the government's suit.' Where
the government's suit is one in Admiralty, the implied waiver extends to any
counterclaim including those seeking large damage awards." 6 Both permissive

108.

645 F.2d at 810.

109. Id. at 811. An individual's remedies under the Tucker Act 28 U.S.C. S 1346(a)(2) (1982),
are limited by the fact that to prevail the claimant must establish the existence of an implied-infact contract of bailment. See generally Kosak v. United States, 679 S.2d 306, aff'd 104 S. Ct. 1519,
1527 nn. 22, 24 (1984) (recognizing that this requirement under the Tucker Act "would operate
to screen out," many cases); see also Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460 (1980).
110. 645 F.2d at 811.
111. Similarly, courts have held that the limitations on suits brought under the Tucker Act
make it an insufficient substitute for Bivens actions. Id. at 811. Accord Weiss v. Lehman, 642 F.2d
265, 267 (9th Cir. 1981). The court in States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (1974),
also squarely rejected the government's suggestions that procedures governing petitions for remission
are not subject to constitutional challenge through a Bivens-type action. Id. at 1158.
112. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation" U.S.
CoNSr., amend. V.

113. 642 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1981).
114. Id. at 267. See also Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1359
n.9 (1979) (construing complaint to contain allegation of "taking" even though phrased in terms
of inverse condemnation because that allegation sufficiently stated that government "exercised its
police powers improperly, and that (the plaintiffs] relied on the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments").
115. See United States v. One Douglas A-26b Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372, 1376 (lth Cir. 1981);
Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1967).
116. See United States v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328 (1924). Upholding a damage award for
over $120,000 against the United States, the Supreme Court observed:
When the United States comes into Court to assert a claim it so far takes the position
of a private suitor as to agree by implication that justice may be done with regard to the
subject matter.... As has been said in other cases the question of damages to the colliding
vessel necessarily arose and it is reasonable for the Court to proceed to the determination
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and compulsory counterclaims may be brought against the United States when
the United States invokes the court's Admiralty jurisdiction.1 1 7 Thus, sovereign

immunity would not bar a Bivens counterclaim.
X.

CONCLUSION

As the government employs every possible weapon in its war against narcotics traffickers, the rights of innocent property owners caught in the crossfire
must not be unduly sacrificed. The safeguards suggested in this article are
neither novel nor extreme. Indeed, they place no significant burdens on the
government or the court system. Government officials who feel confident enough
to initiate a forfeiture case by swearing out a probable cause affidavit and
obtaining an ex parte seizure warrant should be prepared to demonstrate the
existence of the same probable cause in an adversarial contest. If the seizure
and government affidavits were simply part of a ruse employed to harass targeted individuals, or to use discovery provisions of civil forfeiture procedures
as a subterfuge to investigate what is in reality a criminal case, then damage
liability should arise. Such liability is not too harsh a price to extract for the
occasions when misuse occurs or when government hunches prove to be misguided." 8 On the contrary, such minimal limitations on the government's otherwise broad power under forfeiture statutes and jurisdiction are essential if the
government's war on drug traffickers is not to become an uncontrolled dragnet
with an intolerable number of casualties.

of all the questions legitimately involved, even when it results in a judgment for damages
against the United States.
Id. at 339-341
117. 3 MOORE's FEOERAL PRACTICE 13.27, at 13-159 n.7 (citations omitted). Even if a damage
suit is barred, equitable relief against the United States would not necessarily be barred by sovereign
immunity. See generally Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (equitable cause of action against
state officers for violations of constitutional rights not barred by sovereign immunity); United States
v. Lee, 106-U.S. 196 (1882) (action in ejectment against United States officers not barred by
sovereign immunity). Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970) (1984) (injunctive relief and attorneys
fees available in civil rights claim against judge even though damage claim barred by absolute
immunity); Pollgreen v. Morris, 496 F.Supp. 1042 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (enjoining Immigration and
Naturalization officials).
118. See Fonseca v. Regan, 734 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1984) (government may not "capriciously
seize a misdirected suitcase...refuse to return it to a party claiming rightful possession and then
compel that party to undergo the burden of cosdy litigation and unwarranted discovery. Id. at
950.
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